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CONSTRAINING MONITORS 
Veronica Root* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, Herbalife, a global nutrition company, which once boasted net 
sales of $4.8 billion, entered into a negotiated settlement with the Federal 
Trade Commission to resolve allegations that it engaged in deceptive 
business and marketing practices.1  The Federal Trade Commission alleged 
“that the multi-level marketing company’s compensation structure was unfair 
because it rewards distributors for recruiting others to join and purchase 
products in order to advance in the marketing program, rather than in 
response to actual retail demand for the product, causing substantial 
economic injury to many of its distributors.”2  The nature of the allegations 
brought against Herbalife sparked debates about whether Herbalife, a large, 
publicly traded company, was actually a pyramid scheme and resulted in 
Herbalife agreeing to pay $200 million to compensate consumers and settle 
charges brought by the Federal Trade Commission.3 
Additionally, Herbalife agreed to “pay for an Independent Compliance 
Auditor (ICA) who will monitor the company’s adherence to [the court 
ordered settlement provisions] requiring restructuring of [Herbalife’s] 
compensation plan” for a period of seven years.4  A monitor is “(i) an 
independent, private outsider, (ii) employed after an institution is found to 
have engaged in wrongdoing, (iii) who effectuates remediation of the 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  Many thanks to Margaret F. Brinig, 
Guy-Uriel Charles, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Daniel B. Kelly, Jeffrey Pojanowski, and Jay 
Tidmarsh and to the participants of the Fordham University School of Law Stein Center’s 
colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials for helpful comments 
and conversations.  Special thanks to Christine Fimogniari and Catherine Malone for 
invaluable research assistance.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, 
Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto 
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 
(2017). 
 
 1. See Press Release, FTC, Herbalife Will Restructure Its Multi-Level Marketing 
Operations and Pay $200 Million for Consumer Redress to Settle FTC Charges (July 15, 2016) 
[hereinafter Herbalife Press Release], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/ 
07/herbalife-will-restructure-its-multi-level-marketing-operations [https://perma.cc/Q6PP-
5WAN]; see also Frank Partnoy, Is Herbalife a Pyramid Scheme?, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/wall-streets-6-billion-mystery/ 
361624/ [http://perma.cc/7JQF-Y2U4]. 
 2. Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1. 
 3. See Partnoy, supra note 1; Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1. 
 4. Herbalife Press Release, supra note 1. 
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institution’s misconduct, and (iv) provides information to outside actors 
about the status of the institution’s remediation efforts.”5 
Monitorships are highly sought-after engagements, and the Herbalife 
monitorship is no exception.  The Federal Trade Commission issued a public 
“Request for Applications to Serve As Independent Compliance Auditor for 
Herbalife” and received at least twenty-six applications.6  The majority of the 
applicants were lawyers and law firms, but applications were also sent from 
financial companies and consulting agencies.7  In large part, monitorships are 
prized engagements because they are, traditionally, very profitable.  One firm 
estimated that its monitoring costs of Herbalife would be approximately 
$15.7 million over the life of the seven-year term, while another indicated a 
range from $7.8 to $11.5 million.8 
As the Herbalife monitorship demonstrates, there are strong financial 
incentives for parties to pursue monitorships.  For example, the individual 
appointed as “the monitor” can often charge in excess of $1,000 an hour for 
her work alone.9  Individuals who serve as monitors also have strong 
incentives to be repeat players in the monitorship game.  In part, this is 
because monitorships are engagements entered into for finite periods and are 
associated with cooling-off periods before the monitored organization can 
employ the monitor in another capacity.10  Thus, to guarantee long-term 
sources of revenue, individuals and organizations attempting to serve as 
monitors must pursue other representations. 
Monitors have these strong financial motivations while also having been 
granted an enormous amount of responsibility to ensure remediation efforts 
are properly undertaken at the embattled firm.  In some instances, this 
oversight is engaged in to ensure that organizations adhere to U.S. policy 
concerns, like the United States’s position that bribery is an illegitimate 
method of obtaining certain business opportunities.11  But in others, monitors 
are utilized to ensure that everyday citizens are awarded proper compensation 
for large-scale corporate misconduct, such as when banks improperly entered 
into foreclosure proceedings against thousands of homeowners.12 
 
 5. Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 111 (2016). 
 6. C. Ryan Barber, So You Want to Be the Herbalife Compliance Monitor?:  Join the 
Crowd, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202766554985/ 
So-You-Want-to-be-the-Herbalife-Compliance-Monitor-Join-the-Crowd [https://perma.cc/ 
4HL5-3MJW]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. C. Ryan Barber, Big Law Firms Reveal Rates in Pitches for Herbalife Monitor, 
LAW.COM (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/06/big-law-firms-
reveal-rates-in-pitches-for-herbalife-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/USK9-2NYR]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching 
Me:  FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321, 347–48, 
354–55 (2011). 
 11. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 533–
34 (2014) (discussing a monitorship arising out of an alleged scheme to make unlawful 
payments to foreign officials to secure contracts). 
 12. See Root, supra note 5, at 124–25 (discussing monitorship that arose out of the 
“National Mortgage Settlement”). 
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As a result, the stakes are quite high, and it is important that monitors 
effectuate their duties properly and completely.  One might think there are 
official guidelines governing monitors and monitorships when one considers 
that what are essentially private citizens are given an immense amount of 
responsibility for effectuating remediation efforts that are of significance to 
the public.  There are not.  The power of the court to intervene in monitorships 
is very much in flux.  Statutory schemes aimed at governing monitorships 
have stalled and guidance issued by the American Bar Association is 
nonbinding and of little use for nonlawyer monitors.  The primary factor that 
appears to govern behavior across all monitorships is the monitor’s own 
interest in maintaining her good reputation.  This reliance on reputation 
persists despite (i) conflicts regarding the disclosure of monitor reports,13 (ii) 
concerns regarding cronyism in the monitor appointment process,14 and (iii) 
worries about the limited systems for sanctioning monitor misconduct.15 
Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and 
legislators to constrain monitor behavior.  Part II then argues that one reason 
for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations 
to oversee quasi-legal behavior.  It then explains why reputation appears to 
be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today.  Part III discusses 
implications of this Article’s findings.  Specifically, it discusses concerns 
regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship 
between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might 
be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism.  Monitors and those who utilize them 
confront these challenges every day without formal regulatory guidance. 
I.  DIFFICULTY WITH CONSTRAINING MONITORS 
The competition to serve as Herbalife’s monitor was quite fierce.  The 
winner of this competition was Affiliated Monitors, Inc.16  Affiliated 
Monitors is neither an accounting nor law firm.  Rather, it is an organization 
that provides “independent integrity monitoring, compliance/best practice 
programs, auditing, assessments, and other services across a wide range of 
regulated industries.”17  In its application, Affiliated Monitors noted that it 
has “provided independent monitoring on behalf of both federal and state 
agencies,” including the Federal Communications Commission, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, state attorneys general, and 
 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. C. Ryan Barber, FTC and Herbalife Snub Big Law for Consulting Firm as Compliance 
Monitor, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id=1202768 
427209/FTC-and-Herbalife-Snub-Big-Law-for-Consulting-Firm-As-Compliance-Monitor?m 
code=1202617074964&curindex=0&slreturn=20160825110859 [https://perma.cc/U46H-KN 
UN]. 
 17. AFFILIATED MONITORS, INC., PROPOSAL OF AFFILIATED MONITORS, INC. IN RESPONSE 
TO THE REQUEST FOR APPLICATIONS TO SERVE AS THE INDEPENDENT COMPLIANCE AUDITOR FOR 
HERBALIFE 1 (2016) [hereinafter AFFILIATED MONITORS PROPOSAL], https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/public_statements/982603/affiliated_monitors.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
38GE-YLNR]. 
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various U.S. military organizations.18  As such, Affiliated Monitors has 
overseen numerous remediation efforts employed by private firms at the 
behest of governmental agencies, regulators, and prosecutors for over a 
decade.19  Yet, Affiliated Monitors operates in a space devoid of formal 
oversight, leaving very little to constrain the behavior of the monitoring firm 
itself.  Part I.A begins by discussing the challenges associated with 
empowering courts to oversee monitorships.  Part I.B then describes failed 
statutory initiatives and limited prosecutorial guidance. 
A.  Challenges with Court Oversight 
Courts often utilize judicially appointed agents to assist them in their 
adjudication efforts and have done so for decades.20  Monitors are one type 
of court-appointed agent.  “After a finding of liability, [a monitor is] often 
appointed at the remedial stage of complex cases to aid in formulating the 
decree, assist the court in implementing it, and monitor compliance.”21  Over 
time, however, monitorships have evolved and expanded outside the confines 
of the traditional role as court-appointed agents.22 
For instance, regulators and prosecutors utilize “enforcement 
monitorships,” like that used for the Herbalife settlement, when entering into 
negotiated settlement agreements to ensure that the monitored organization 
adheres to the terms of the agreement.23  In an enforcement monitorship, the 
monitor acts as an agent of the government,24 instead of an agent of the court, 
and ensures that the monitored organization complies with the government’s 
specifications.25  The negotiated settlement agreements that give rise to 
enforcement monitorships are sometimes entered into after formal 
proceedings against a corporation for alleged misconduct have been 
brought.26  In these instances, the agreement, often termed a deferred 
prosecution agreement, is negotiated by the regulator or prosecutor and the 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Root, supra note 5, at 116 (“Courts have used independent, private outsiders—court-
appointed agents—to assist courts in their adjudication efforts for decades.  These individuals 
are referred to by a number of terms often used interchangeably, including master, special 
master, receiver, trustee, or monitor.”). 
 21. Ellen E. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 352 
(discussing courts’ ability to appoint an outsider to assist the court under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53). 
 22. See Root, supra note 5, at 120–23. 
 23. Id. at 124–27. 
 24. Guidance to Department of Justice attorneys regarding the use of monitors in 
negotiated agreements states that the monitor is to be independent from and not an agent of 
the government.  See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to 
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys 4–5 (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Morford Memo], 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8942-WS7R].  Despite this, in enforcement monitorships, the monitor functionally acts as an 
agent of the government in a manner that looks quite similar to when a monitor is formally 
acting as an agent of the court.  See Root, supra note 11, at 528 n.12. 
 25. See Root, supra note 5, at 124. 
 26. Id. 
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corporation.27  The parties then request that the court enter the agreement in 
lieu of pursuing the normal adjudication schedule.28  The involvement of the 
court in these instances has raised questions about the scope of the court’s 
authority to oversee negotiated settlement agreements and the monitorships 
they often require. 
For example, a line of cases in the D.C. Circuit appears to suggest that 
courts have little power over monitorships and negotiated settlement 
agreements.  In 2012, a D.C. district court determined that reports prepared 
by a monitor were judicial records subject to the common law right of access 
and ordered that the reports be disclosed publicly.29  On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, thereby halting the public 
release of the monitor’s reports.30  The D.C. Circuit explained that the records 
were not pertinent to monitoring judicial conduct, because the monitor’s 
reports 
do not record, explain, or justify the court’s decision in any way—nor could 
they.  They did not exist yet, and nothing in the record suggest[ed] the 
district court cared a whit about the results of the [monitor’s] investigation 
as long as [the company] in fact initiated the investigation.31 
In 2015, a D.C. district court held that a court could choose to accept or reject 
a deferred prosecution agreement pursuant to its supervisory powers.32  
When rejecting the agreement, the court provided several reasons for why it 
found the agreement to be deficient, including its failure to require the 
appointment of an independent monitor to verify that the company remained 
in compliance with the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement.33  On 
appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.34  The D.C. Circuit concluded that 
the district court had no authority to make substantive assessments regarding 
 
 27. See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 10, at 348–49. 
 28. Because deferred prosecution agreements involve the formal initiation of criminal 
charges within the judicial system, the agreements trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s time limits 
for the commencement of a criminal trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 
F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  The Speedy Trial Act specifically allows a court to suspend 
the running of the time within which to commence a trial for any period during which the 
government defers prosecution under a deferred prosecution agreement. Id.  Thus, parties 
wishing to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement must go to the court to have the time 
within which to commence trial suspended.  See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate 
Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833902 (“Under a 
[deferred prosecution agreement], the prosecutor[] files charges but agrees not to seek 
conviction.”) [https://perma.cc/DUV6-A9L2]. 
 29. SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 30. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d at 2–3. 
 31. Id. at 4. 
 32. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated 
and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 33. Id. at 166. 
 34. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733. 
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the terms included in a deferred prosecution agreement, including 
monitorship provisions.35 
By contrast, however, in 2016, the Eastern District of New York 
maintained that the court had authority to approve or deny a deferred 
prosecution agreement and ordered the public release of the associated 
enforcement monitor’s reports despite the vigorous objections of the 
government, the monitor, and the monitored organization.36  The case is now 
on appeal before the Second Circuit.37 
Assuming the Second Circuit finds that courts have the power to make 
decisions regarding deferred prosecution agreements and monitorships, the 
decision would be limited in that it would not be applicable to all negotiated 
settlement agreements.  If prosecutors or regulators choose to pursue a 
different type of negotiated settlement agreement, like a nonprosecution 
agreement, which does not require any court involvement, it is not at all clear 
that those types of negotiated settlement agreements would be subject to 
court oversight or involvement.  There are scholars who argue that 
monitorships, whether arising out of deferred or nonprosecution agreements, 
should be subject to court oversight,38 but as of yet, the issue remains 
unsettled, as evidenced by the recent D.C. Circuit decisions. 
Even if courts were to come to the conclusion that all monitorships arising 
out of negotiated settlement agreements between regulators or prosecutors 
and corporations should be subject to the same type of court oversight as 
court-ordered monitorships, the use of monitors has evolved beyond the 
enforcement monitorship context into other areas where court involvement 
appears wholly inappropriate.39  For example, a public relations monitorship 
is sometimes employed by an organization on a completely voluntary basis, 
without the involvement of any regulatory or governmental body, to 
investigate “the scope of organizational wrongdoing” and to provide “a 
public accounting of the investigation, along with suggestions for 
remediation measures.”40  “The monitorship is meant to remediate the 
underlying organizational misconduct, but it is also meant to heal the 
damaged relationship between the monitored organization and the public 
through the monitorship’s deliverable—the public monitorship report.”41  
Because the monitorship is entered into on a completely voluntary basis, “it 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013); HSBC Letter in Support of Filing under Seal at 5, HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter HSBC Letter]. 
 37. Jody Godoy, Public Entitled to HSBC Monitor Report, 2nd Circ. Told, LAW360 (Oct. 
20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/853062/public-entitled-to-hsbc-monitor-report-
2nd-circ-told [https://perma.cc/FX8E-YHBE]. 
 38. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:  HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 176–77, 192 (2014) (discussing the need for more robust court oversight of all 
monitorships that are the outgrowth of a deferred or nonprosecution agreement). 
 39. See Root, supra note 5, at 137–42 (discussing public relations monitorships). 
 40. Id. at 137. 
 41. Id. 
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does not appear that robust court oversight . . . would be appropriate” in this 
setting.42 
The upshot is that while the use of monitors originated in the courts,43 their 
use has evolved beyond traditional judicial settings.44  This evolution makes 
it difficult to rely on courts alone to ensure that monitors are accomplishing 
their oversight duties in a proper and ethical manner.  Additionally, because 
monitorships now arise in a variety of settings and contexts, it may be that 
different types of constraints are needed to address the particular challenges 
individual monitorships present.45 
B.  Failed Statutory Attempts 
and Limited Prosecutorial Guidance 
The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act was proposed in the 
House of Representatives in both 200846 and 2009,47 but it died in committee 
each time.  The proposed legislation (i) required monitors to be selected from 
a public national pool of prequalified candidates, (ii) granted final monitor 
selection approval to a judge, (iii) dictated that the monitor selection process 
be “an open and competitive one where the monitor’s powers should extend 
no further than the compliance concerns at the [monitored] firm,” and (iv) 
required monitors to receive payments based on a flat- and fixed-fee 
structure.48  It appears the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act arose, 
at least in part, due to concerns raised by a monitorship undertaken by former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft in the fall of 2007.49 
When Chris Christie served as the federal prosecutor in New Jersey, he 
turned to his former boss, John Ashcroft, to serve as a monitor to Zimmer 
Holdings, a medical supply company in Indiana.50  The monitorship was 
awarded without public notice or bidding and was worth $28 million to $52 
million for eighteen months of work.51  The contract was considered by some 
to be “evidence of political favoritism in the Bush administration’s long-
embattled Justice Department,” and it prompted an internal Department of 
Justice review that resulted in formal guidelines to prosecutors in the 
selection and use of monitors.52  These formal guidelines are contained in 
what has colloquially been termed the “Morford Memo.” 
 
 42. Id. at 147. 
 43. See id. at 116–18. 
 44. See id. at 118–23. 
 45. See id. at 142–54. 
 46. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 47. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 48. See Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM:  USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 226, 238 (Anthony 
S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
 49. Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/washington/10justice.html?_r= [https:// 
perma.cc/X7BL-UWGW]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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The Morford Memo provides guidance to all Department of Justice 
employees regarding the selection and use of monitors in deferred and 
nonprosecution agreements with corporations.53  The memorandum contains 
nine “principles” that provide standards for monitor selection, independence, 
responsibilities, communication, recommendations, reporting obligations, 
and duration.54 
The proposed legislation and the Morford Memo were designed to provide 
greater clarity and accountability in the utilization of monitorships.  
Unfortunately, each of these initiatives is relatively narrow in scope because 
they apply to a limited subset of monitorships.  The restrictions put forth in 
the proposed legislation and in the Morford Memo would not, however, apply 
to the Herbalife monitorship, as it is not a result of a deferred or 
nonprosecution agreement.55  Instead, it is the product of a negotiated 
settlement agreement between the Federal Trade Commission and Herbalife 
that took the form of a stipulated order for permanent injunction and 
monetary judgment.56  Additionally, the Herbalife monitorship is not subject 
to the Morford Memo because the Morford Memo “does not apply to 
agencies other than the Department of Justice”; the Federal Trade 
Commission is independent of the Department of Justice.57  Moreover, 
neither the proposed legislation nor the Morford Memo would govern public 
relations monitorships.58 
Thus, attempts to constrain monitorships through statutory intervention 
and prosecutorial guidance, like the use of court oversight, appear to be ill 
suited to tackle the full scope of challenges that arise when confronting 
monitorships.59  Because monitorships are utilized in a variety of contexts by 
a diverse group of regulators, prosecutors, and private parties, attempts to 
constrain monitorships have proven quite difficult. 
 
 53. See generally Morford Memo, supra note 24. 
 54. Id. at 3–8. 
 55. Cf. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (“A bill [t]o regulate certain deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution 
agreements in Federal criminal cases.”). 
 56. See Stipulation to Entry of Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, 
FTC v. Herbalife Int’l. of Am., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-05217 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) [hereinafter 
Herbalife Agreement]. 
 57. Morford Memo, supra note 24, at 2–3. 
 58. See supra Part I.A. 
 59. Other tactics can be utilized to provide standards and norms to govern the behavior of 
various compliance actors.  For example, “[l]awyers appearing and practicing before federal 
[administrative] agencies . . . are often subject to additional ethical rules promulgated by the 
agencies.” George M. Cohen, The Laws of Agency Lawyering, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 
1963 (2016).  Some agency rules apply to lawyers only, while others apply “to any person 
appearing in a representative capacity before an agency.” Id. at 1964.  Thus, it would seem 
possible for agencies to develop their own set of rules governing monitor behavior; but 
because monitors are used in so many diverse contexts and before so many different regulators 
and prosecutors, any attempt to use this tactic to regulate monitorships would necessarily be 
limited in scope and breadth. 
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II.  PROFESSIONALISM’S FAILURES 
AND REPUTATION’S LIMITATIONS 
The explanation provided in Part I is consistent with previous scholarship 
and accepted understandings regarding the evolution of monitorships and the 
difficulties associated with creating a regime of oversight to govern monitor 
behavior.60  It is, however, incomplete. 
When private actors are charged with performing certain actions on behalf 
of the public, there are often mechanisms put into place to ensure that the 
private actors execute those duties responsibly.  For example, lawyers are 
required to adhere to certain standards of professional conduct promulgated 
by state bar associations that can discipline attorneys who violate those 
standards.61  Similarly, certified public accountants must adhere to specific 
state licensure requirements to practice public accounting.62  Further, 
individuals who serve as brokers for, or dealers to, third parties in the sale of 
securities are required to register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, join a self-regulatory organization, and adhere to state 
requirements for a person conducting business as a broker-dealer within that 
state.63  Monitors are not all that different from these individuals. 
Monitors are private actors who manage the largely public function of 
overseeing remediation efforts at dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations 
every day.  They are not, however, subject to licensing, registration, or formal 
regulatory requirements, but they could be.  Part II.A begins by explaining 
how bar associations view their regulatory role in a narrow fashion, which 
has allowed quasi-legal functions to operate outside of formal oversight.  Part 
II.B then discusses a potential fix proposed by the bar, which is, at best, quite 
limited.  Finally, Part II.C concludes by turning to the main factor that 
appears to serve as a constraint on monitor behavior:  reputation. 
A.  The Bar’s Failure 
Lawyer conduct is regulated by state bar associations, which promulgate 
rules of professional conduct.64  Current rules, while sometimes referred to 
as ethical norms, are more regulatory in nature than true expositions 
 
 60. See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 683 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, 
The Corporate Monitor:  The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2007) 
(discussing the historical underpinnings of corporate monitors and relating corporate monitors 
to the use of special masters, which dates back to the early sixteenth century); Root, supra 
note 11, at 526. 
 61. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 13–18 
(4th ed. 2005). 
 62. See CPA Licensure, AM. INST. CPAS, https://www.aicpa.org/BECOMEACPA/ 
LICENSURE/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (discussing CPA licensure 
requirements and providing state information on specific state requirements) 
[https://perma.cc/7QPW-P6JU]. 
 63. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ 
bdguide.htm#II (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DN5H-4ZUK]. 
 64. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 61, at 13–14. 
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regarding proper ethical behavior.65  The rules’ “appeal is not to conscience, 
but to sanction.  It seeks mandate rather than insight.”66  This view of the role 
of the bar as a mere regulatory mechanism, however, was not always the case.  
Fifty years ago, understandings of professionalism 
conceive[d] of the professions as groups of individuals who have mastered 
an area of knowledge through special training.  Because they gain[ed] their 
power through knowledge—not wealth or political prestige—professionals 
[were considered] uniquely suited to ascertain what is best for the public as 
a whole and to suppress their own immediate interest in achieving it.67 
Indeed, the “government and society in general turned to the well-trained 
expert,” like a lawyer, “to help preserve fairness, justice, and progress in an 
increasingly complex industrial world.”68  In particular, lawyers were 
conceived of as intermediaries between the interests of the state and society.69  
Lawyers’ fidelity to the rule of law as officers of the court required them to 
pursue justice over self-motivated interests.  Additionally, lawyers “were 
considered critical not only for their understanding of complex facts, but also 
for their ability to use those facts to envision a new and better community.”70 
Yet, by the 1970s and 1990s lawyers abandoned this role “in favor of new 
roles straddling law and business.”71 
The organized bar was once intent on drawing sharp distinctions between 
law and business, but the rise of the regulatory state changed the playing 
field.  As regulation came to pervade society, new kinds of work and roles 
proliferated.  Law and business grew together, and a murky and ambiguous 
boundary zone replaced the once-crisp demarcation between the two.  
Today’s quasi-legal roles, embraced by many lawyers and encouraged by 
the organized bar, exist in this broadened and blurred boundary zone in 
which legal training and licensure are valuable but professional ethical 
obligations are unclear.72 
The role of monitors and the function they provide to society exists in this 
murky, quasi-legal boundary zone.73 
 
 65. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 
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(2016). 
 68. Id. at 650. 
 69. Id. at 652; see also Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice:  The Twenty-First-Century Legal 
Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1247 (2014). 
 70. Roiphe, supra note 67, at 660–61. 
 71. Remus, supra note 69, at 1247; Roiphe, supra note 67, at 663, 672–73; see also 
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Monitors are not in an attorney-client relationship with the organizations 
they monitor, even when the monitor is, as is often the case, an attorney.  As 
was the case in the Herbalife monitorship, the development of a formal 
attorney-client relationship during the course of a monitorship is either 
strictly prohibited74 or purposefully avoided.75  This is despite the fact that at 
least part of the service monitors provide looks very similar to the service 
lawyers often provide to clients when in a formal attorney-client 
relationship—advising clients on whether their activities conform to legal 
and regulatory requirements.  Monitoring relationships, however, are treated 
as outside the bounds of attorney regulation.  In part, this is because the 
monitor’s legal advice is almost inextricably intertwined with what would 
qualify as oversight of the routine development of business strategies and 
practices.  This secondary piece is what causes standard regulation by bar 
associations to be inapplicable to monitorships because the bar has chosen to 
provide one “single, broadly applicable code of conduct”76 in lieu of a more 
complex regulatory system. 
Recognizing the problem of a unitary system of attorney regulation, legal 
academics in the early 1990s promoted the use of “context-specific rules [that 
would] govern different practice areas.”77  The original context-specific rules 
proposed by legal academics in the early 1990s were suggested, at least in 
part, because “lawyers need more leeway to advocate zealously for clients 
when litigating than when offering advice and guidance in a nonadversarial 
context.”78  Like lawyers operating outside of a litigation setting, a monitor 
is not in a role that requires advocacy.  Instead, the monitor is charged with 
overseeing a company’s remediation effort and, when necessary, assisting the 
monitored firm in making the adjustments necessary to ensure success.  The 
monitor provides this service to the monitored company, but it is also serving 
a public function.  Yet, even the context-specific rules advocated in the early 
1990s failed to “account[] for one of the most significant sources of change 
and ethical tension facing the profession today—the emergence of a robust 
but ambiguous boundary zone between law and business.”79 
The bar could have responded to the proliferation of new, quasi-legal roles 
“by working to extend its jurisdiction and ethical rules to cover additional 
work sites,” but, instead, “bar leaders declined to act definitively, neither 
bringing quasi-legal work clearly within, nor excluding it clearly from, the 
profession’s jurisdiction.”80  As a result, in most states, “lawyers who offer 
 
 74. See, e.g., Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18. 
 75. See Root, supra note 5, at 138–39. 
 76. Remus, supra note 69, at 1245. 
 77. Id.  Today, academics continue to recognize the utility in adopting legal ethics rules 
that are of a more specialized nature, whether through formal rules of professional conduct or 
through the adopting of rules by courts. See, e.g., Bruce Green, Should There Be a Specialized 
Ethics Code for Death-Penalty Defense Lawyers?, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527 (2016). 
 78. Remus, supra note 69, at 1255 (citing David Wilkins, Making Context Count:  
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1183–84 (1993)). 
 79. Id. at 1256. 
 80. Id. at 1260. 
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law-related services without also engaging in the practice of law are not 
bound by” the rules of professional conduct.81 
Thus, a lawyer can be a member of the bar, market his legal expertise and 
prowess, be awarded a monitorship, and then operate the monitorship with 
almost no fear of reprisal from the bar should the lawyer-monitor engage in 
inappropriate conduct.  For example, in Affiliated Monitors’s application to 
serve as Herbalife’s monitor, it notes that its proposed team members include 
individuals with experience as “government and private practice 
attorneys.”82  It also indicates that the monitoring team would be led by two 
specific individuals, one of whom has significant past legal experience and 
current, active involvement in the American Bar Association and the 
National Association of Former U.S. Attorneys.83  Yet, as is noted in the 
application, “[o]ne distinguishing characteristic of Affiliated Monitors is that 
monitoring is [its] business; it is not a sideline to legal or consulting 
services.”84  Because of the bar’s decision to omit quasi-legal conduct from 
attorney regulation, Affiliated Monitors’s business activities and the 
activities of the lawyers they employ will largely proceed without formal, 
independent oversight.85 
B.  The Quasi Fix 
Despite the limitations of the bar’s unitary system of regulation, it has 
acknowledged the need for monitor guidance.  Because the bar chose not to 
formally regulate quasi-legal roles, however, its options were limited.  On 
August 4, 2015, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates 
approved black letter “ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for Corporate 
Monitors.”86  The standards were described as “for the first time—
provid[ing] a framework through which corporate monitors, legislatures, 
courts and administrative agencies can make decisions on developing and 
implementing an organization’s corporate compliance and ethics program.”87  
The standards are, necessarily, nonbinding and advisory in nature for both 
lawyers and nonlawyers.88  Their goal is not to provide formal regulation but 
 
 81. Id. at 1261. 
 82. See AFFILIATED MONITORS PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 83. Id. at 15–16. 
 84. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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 87. Id. 
 88. Work remains underway to provide commentary to accompany the “black letter” 
standards. Monitors Standards, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/ 
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instead to provide guidance to individuals—lawyers and nonlawyers alike—
who undertake monitorships. 
From a substantive perspective, the standards appropriately provide a high-
level overview of the types of concerns and issues that monitorships raise.  
The standards discuss issues for parties to consider in the selection of 
monitors, the development of a work plan, and the setting of fees and 
compensation.89  They also provide a strong set of recommendations for how 
to analyze potential conflicts of interest within the monitoring relationship.90 
The standards, however, do not engage in an in-depth consideration of a 
variety of issues that are of common concern regarding monitorships.  For 
example, the standards explain that the order or agreement resulting in the 
monitorship “should state whether the Monitor’s report is to be confidential 
or whether it is to be made available to the public,” but it does not provide 
any guidance on when a report should remain confidential or how to ensure 
such confidentiality.91  Thus, while the standards are certainly helpful, they 
do not appear to wrestle with some of the thornier issues that arise during the 
course of today’s monitor engagements. 
C.  Reliance on Reputation 
As monitorships evolved outside the context of formal adjudication, the 
monitoring relationship began to form between the monitor and monitored 
organization through what are essentially private contracts.  These private 
contracts do not look all that dissimilar from the contracts between attorneys 
or auditors and their clients.  For example, Affiliated Monitors and Herbalife 
will enter into an agreement for Affiliated Monitors to provide monitoring 
services on behalf of Herbalife, and Herbalife will agree to pay Affiliated 
Monitors for its services.92  The terms of the monitorship agreement, at least 
in part, are predetermined based on the negotiated settlement agreement 
entered into between Herbalife and the Federal Trade Commission,93 but that 
does not erode the reality that contractual terms control the relationship 
between Herbalife and Affiliated Monitors.  Because (i) attempts to oversee 
monitorships via the courts are limited in scope, (ii) legislative efforts have 
failed, and (iii) the bar has chosen not to regulate quasi-legal conduct, these 
private contractual terms govern the conduct of the individual monitors who 
are charged with overseeing remediation efforts at organizations involved in 
misconduct.94 
 
standards/MonitorsStandardsFourthEdition-TableofContents.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) 
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 90. Id. Standards 24-2.4(4), 24-2.5, 24-4.6(2). 
 91. Id. Standard 24-4.3(4). 
 92. Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18; Barber, supra note 16. 
 93. Herbalife Agreement, supra note 56, at 18–23. 
 94. The contractual terms governing the monitorship must, however, adhere to any 
restrictions set forth by a court or negotiated settlement agreement.  For example, a negotiated 
settlement agreement may state that (i) the monitor is not permitted to enter into an attorney-
client relationship with the monitored organization or (ii) certain procedures must be followed 
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As evidenced by the numerous applications filed to serve as Herbalife’s 
monitor, individuals and entities are eager to enter into monitoring 
agreements.  As such, they work hard to make themselves look like attractive 
candidates to serve as a corporation’s monitor.  Because the monitored 
organization is typically unable to discharge the monitor if it is displeased 
with the monitor’s work,95 monitored organizations that are able to provide 
input on the identity of a monitor take the selection process quite seriously.  
In many instances, however, the external monitor must also market 
themselves to a party outside the monitoring contract, whether that be a 
regulator, prosecutor, or the public at large.  For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission and Herbalife selected the monitor via mutual agreement.96  As 
such, the monitor must often also meet what can be very exacting standards 
of third parties with a vested interest in the monitoring engagement.  These 
unique features of monitorship relationships and agreements make the 
monitor’s reputation of incredibly high value. 
“Reputational capital is the value of [a] contractor’s reputation in the 
relevant marketplace.”97  As demonstrated by the proceeding discussion, it 
appears that a monitor’s reputational capital is quite important in its pursuit 
of monitorship engagements.  If a monitor develops a bad reputation with 
either monitored firms or interested third parties, such as regulators, the 
monitor will likely find it difficult to obtain future engagements.  Research 
has demonstrated that, when self-enforcing contracts are involved, “the party 
with significant reputational capital would think long and hard before 
violating unstated contractual norms and damaging her valuable reputation,” 
making the party “more trustworthy than a transactor whose reputation has 
little value.”98  The majority of monitoring contracts do not appear to be self-
enforcing,99 but the overarching principle does appear applicable in the 
monitoring context, where, unlike in the context of the traditional attorney-
client relationship, there are very limited options to exit the monitoring 
agreement.  Monitors, while not subject to governance from courts, formal 
standards, or formal rules, are thought to be unlikely to engage in unethical 
or inappropriate behavior because they maintain a high interest in preserving 
the value of their reputational capital.100  Thus, the monitor’s interest in 
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maintaining positive reputational capital serves to constrain the monitor’s 
behavior. 
And yet, while reputational capital has a variety of benefits, it also has 
certain drawbacks.  Reputational capital makes it important for monitors to 
manage their conduct within the marketplace of entities that utilize 
monitoring services, but this incentive is inherently self-interested on the part 
of the monitor who wants to obtain additional monitorship engagements.  
Scholars have expressed concern about the use of reputational capital to 
restrain behavior in similar settings.  For example, financial intermediaries, 
like monitors, rely heavily upon their reputations.  Indeed, “many economists 
and other academics have long argued that the value of a good reputation 
should ensure that intermediaries generally act honestly and place their 
clients’ interests above their own.”101  Recent scholarship, however, explains 
that “a series of scandals . . . suggest investment bankers, credit rating 
agencies, accountants, and other intermediaries regularly prioritize their 
short-term interests in fee maximization, even when doing so is contrary to 
their clients’ best interests.”102  This concern is 
exacerbated when a class of intermediaries is entrenched and new entry 
difficult, as the value of reputation in such settings tends to be determined 
on a relative basis.  When a party has no choice but to rely upon a particular 
type of intermediary, the business will go to the intermediaries whose 
reputations are relatively untarnished, no matter how far from shiny that 
might be.103 
Thus, a monitor has a strong incentive to carefully manage her reputation in 
an effort to ensure that she will be chosen for future monitorships, but 
reliance on reputational capital is inherently limited in its effectiveness. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
As explained in Parts I and II, monitors, like Affiliated Monitors, enter into 
monitorship agreements every day without the benefit of concrete rules 
governing their conduct.  In turn, the remediation effort that the monitor is 
meant to oversee for the protection of those harmed by corporate 
misconduct—like the consumers and employees who entered into 
transactions with Herbalife—is plagued by structural weaknesses that could 
undermine the monitorship’s long-term effectiveness.  Additionally, a 
monitor’s reputational capital alone has proven insufficient to address these 
potential problems, as it does not provide guidance on many difficult policy 
issues relevant to monitorships. 
In an effort to begin to address these issues, this part outlines three 
potential areas where additional research would be beneficial in attempting 
to discern appropriate regulatory mechanisms for governing monitorships.  
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First, the difficulties associated with determining when, how, and to whom 
information gathered by a monitor should be disseminated is a challenging 
issue that could benefit from additional scholarly attention.  Second, the 
concept of monitor independence would benefit from more analysis and 
scholarly inquiry.  Third, strategies for better utilizing a monitor’s identity as 
a sanctioning mechanism should be considered and assessed. 
A.  Information Disclosure 
Developing a strong, deeply ingrained compliance culture is no simple 
task, and poses particular challenges to HSBC Group in light of the depth 
of the cultural deficiencies that fostered the intentional criminal conduct 
that led to the [deferred prosecution agreement] and the size and scope of 
the Bank’s operations.  Although the Bank has taken many positive steps 
during the past year, the fact remains that it has moved too slowly and made 
too little progress toward instilling the type of culture it will need in order 
to build an effective [anti-money laundering] and sanctions compliance 
program—and to maintain that program when it is no longer subject to the 
Monitor’s supervision.104 
–HSBC Monitor’s Report 
Should statements like the above be public and, if not, how can the public 
be assured that a company will take the actions necessary to assure similar 
misconduct does not reoccur?  Those questions appear to be at the center of 
a several-year feud involving the judiciary, government regulators and 
prosecutors, corporate entities, private attorneys, reporters, and the public at 
large about the proper regulation and oversight of the use of monitors. 
For example, HSBC failed to enhance its anti-money laundering 
compliance, which created a deficient anti-money laundering program.  As a 
result, “at least $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds, including proceeds 
of drug trafficking by the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico . . . were laundered 
through HSBC Bank USA without being detected.”105  Ultimately, HSBC 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice 
and agreed to retain a monitor for a five-year term.106  The monitor’s 
mandate, in part, was to “mak[e] recommendations reasonably designed to 
improve the effectiveness of HSBC Group’s program for ensuring 
compliance with anti-money laundering laws as well as HSBC Group’s 
implementation and adherence to [certain] remedial measures.”107  To 
facilitate its mandate, the monitor “conduct[ed] an initial review and 
prepare[ed] an initial report, followed by at least four (4) follow-up reviews 
and report[s].”108  One of these required reports has sparked the latest high-
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profile debate regarding the appropriate set of rules and standards for 
governing monitorships. 
The question of whether monitor reports should be made public is not an 
easy one.  The monitor himself, despite criticizing HSBC in the report, 
argued against its public disclosure: 
I believe that maintaining the confidentiality of the First Annual Follow-
Up Review Report is in the interest of an effective monitorship because it 
is clear to me that confidentiality encourages cooperation from the 
employees of HSBC Group.  Much of my work as Monitor depends on full, 
open, and candid cooperation from employees at all levels of the Bank, and 
thus far, I have enjoyed an appropriate level of such cooperation from 
employees of HSBC Group.  I believe, however, that releasing this report 
publicly would have a chilling effect on those employees, and the level of 
cooperation and candor that I would receive could decrease substantially.  
The employees might well become concerned that they would suffer 
negative repercussions from their statements, or information they have 
provided, being made public.  The result would be that I would have less 
information with which to make my findings and recommendations, which 
ultimately would not be to the benefit of the public or the Bank.109 
The monitor’s claims create a bit of a conundrum.  The public has an interest 
in knowing whether HSBC has taken steps to ensure that it will not launder 
the money of Mexican drug cartels in the future.  Yet, if the public’s detailed 
knowledge of the remediation process will deter cooperation by HSBC 
employees with the monitor, public disclosure may actually harm HSBC’s 
efforts toward remediation.  Relying on reputational capital to govern 
monitorships cannot solve this quagmire. 
Thus, a full inquiry is needed into the set of rules and standards that might 
balance these competing interests, and this analysis may need to 
acknowledge that different rules could be needed for different monitorship 
contexts.  Moreover, because monitorships, as noted above, are utilized by 
dozens of state and federal regulators to oversee and assist in remediation 
efforts across a variety of regulatory areas, the stakes are quite high. 
B.  Monitor Independence 
Concerns regarding monitor independence almost always focus on the 
monitor’s independence from the monitored institution.  The general 
requirement that a monitor be independent of the monitored institution is 
likely a result of (i) concerns regarding monitor capture110 and (ii) a relatively 
simple conflict of interest analysis.111  The requirement is viewed as 
relatively uncontroversial, and a review of management literature suggests 
that the use of an independent, private outsider is likely a sound decision. 
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For example, the institution is more likely to get an untainted assessment 
from someone without a strong, prior affiliation with the monitored 
institution. 
[A] study of accountants has demonstrated that the entity an accountant 
works for has a significant impact on the accountant’s findings.  In one 
study, “139 professional auditors employed full-time by one of the Big Four 
accounting firms in the United States” were given auditing problems to 
assess.  “Half of the participants’ materials told them that they had been 
hired as the external auditor for the firm in question.”  The other half were 
told “that they were working for an outside investor considering investing 
money in the firm.”  The study hypothesized, and proved, that “participants 
would be more likely to conclude that the accounting behind a firm’s 
financial reports complied with [GAAP] if they were working for the firm 
rather than for an outsider investor.”  This study confirmed opinions 
that . . . had [been] expressed [by others].  Specifically, that 
“[i]ndependence is necessary to prevent auditors from biasing their 
opinions in favor of their clients.” . . .  [T]his study demonstrate[s] the 
importance of maintaining a strong level of independence when attempting 
to evaluate an institution’s compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements.112 
Thus, the insistence that monitors remain completely independent of the 
monitored organization should likely reassure regulators, prosecutors, and 
the public that the monitorship is likely to result in appropriate remediation 
efforts.113 
Despite the clear benefits of requiring the monitor to remain independent 
of the monitored organization, there are at least two additional concerns that 
may be preventing the monitor from achieving true monitor independence.  
First, monitors, while unable to turn a monitored organization immediately 
into a client after the conclusion of the monitorship, can typically begin to do 
work for the monitored organization one or two years after the conclusion of 
the monitorship.114  This relatively short “cooling-off” period may create the 
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same incentive that the external auditor felt to ensure a “good” outcome on 
behalf of the audited institution.115 
Second, there has likely been insufficient attention paid to the importance 
of employing a monitor that has significant independence from a previous 
role as an employee of the government or a regulator.116  For example, “half 
of all corporate monitors appointed in Justice Department deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporate defendants since 
2001 are former prosecutors.”117  The use of former prosecutors and high-
ranking government officials, in some instances shortly after the individuals 
depart government service, may result in the monitor’s failure to take a truly 
“independent” perspective when conducting the monitorship.  Instead, the 
monitor may still be viewing information from her role as a prosecutor, which 
could affect her assessment of the activities being undertaken by the firm.  
For example, a recent hire by a prominent monitoring firm stated that, 
“[c]oming from the government, I understand the regulator’s perspective, and 
I’m well positioned to help companies reform their practices to meet 
regulators’ expectations.”118  This perspective may very well be important, 
but the reliance on former government attorneys to serve as monitors does 
raise a variety of questions regarding whether monitors are truly acting as 
independent, objective evaluators. 
The upshot is that additional research into the appropriate boundaries of 
monitor independence is needed and this too is something that cannot be 
answered by relying on the constraint of reputational capital.  It may be that 
requiring a more robust independence requirement for monitors may serve to 
improve the effectiveness of monitorships.  Additionally, an independence 
requirement could possibly address concerns of both regulators and 
institutions alike regarding the monitor’s ability to effectively oversee the 
monitored organization’s remediation efforts. 
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C.  Identity as a Sanctioning Mechanism 
As is explained above, the primary check on monitor behavior is the 
monitor’s own concern with her reputation.  Risking one’s own reputation 
when taking on an engagement can serve as a powerful motivator, and it may 
be enough to serve as an effective check on the conduct of most monitors.  
Therefore, it may be sensible to require any use of a monitor to publicly name 
a person—not an entity—who is responsible for overseeing the monitorship.  
An actual person should take ownership of the monitorship, thereby risking 
her own reputation if the monitorship fails. 
For example, the “Independent Foreclosure Review”119 demonstrates what 
can happen when a monitorship occurs without requiring an individual to 
take personal responsibility for the monitorship.  As part of the Independent 
Foreclosure Review, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
Federal Reserve required banks to retain independent consultants to oversee 
the banks’ efforts to remediate the harm caused by the banks’ failures to 
comply with their own policies and procedures.  The independent consultants 
selected were not individuals who could be held personally responsible for 
mistakes or inappropriate conduct; they were large entities, like Big Four 
accounting firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte.120  As such, 
when they failed to detect relatively routine issues—like conflicts of 
interests—there was no individual person to hold responsible.  There was just 
an entity to fine or fire. 
People can hide within entities; they can blame mistakes or wrongdoing 
on other employees, unclear guidance, or a myriad of other excuses.  But if 
monitors were required to identify, explicitly and publicly, an actual person 
to be held responsible for ensuring that the monitorship is functioning 
properly, it could serve as a way to facilitate a sanction for inappropriate 
monitor behavior. 
In turn, if monitors were individually identified, it may provide an 
opportunity to rely on existing professional standards as a way to encourage 
appropriate monitor behavior.  If, for example, monitors were named 
individually and were members of a regulated profession, it may provide an 
opportunity for sanctioning monitors who engage in inappropriate behavior, 
albeit in very narrow contexts.  For example, if monitors were required to be 
attorneys and, thus, were members of the legal profession, it is likely that a 
catchall provision like Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c)—which 
makes it professional misconduct to “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”121—could serve as a basis for 
personally sanctioning monitors engaged in inappropriate behavior.  During 
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the Independent Foreclosure Review, several of the accounting firms retained 
as independent consultants failed to properly identify and disclose relevant 
conflicts of interest.122  In some instances, this resulted in sanctions to the 
general institutions retained as monitors, but there were no formal personal 
consequences levied as a result of this failure.  If an individual lawyer were 
retained as the monitor instead, it would allow for potential personal, 
reputational consequences as well as the possibility, even if unlikely, of 
pursuing professional sanctions specifically against the individual.  In short, 
the ability to obtain an official sanction that could impact the individual 
monitor’s livelihood would likely create a strong, personal incentive for the 
monitor to engage in robust ethical conduct.  The best mechanisms for 
achieving a sanction for monitors, however, require more thought, research, 
and analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Monitors are charged with overseeing an institution’s effort to address 
misconduct within its walls, while the monitor herself acts without formal 
oversight or technical restraint.  This Article adds to the understanding of 
monitorships in three important ways.  First, this Article demonstrates how 
the lack of regulation governing monitorships is, in part, the result of the bar’s 
resistance to regulate quasi-legal positions undertaken by lawyers.  Second, 
it shows that the primary constraint on a monitor’s behavior is the monitor’s 
own interest in her reputation.  Third, and most importantly, this Article 
highlights several limitations of reputational capital as a constraining 
mechanism on monitor behavior and long-term monitorship policy, thereby 
demonstrating the need for more robust and careful research into several 
areas of potential concern for monitorships. 
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